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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Kate S. Cook*
Alan J. Hamilton"
Brandon L. Peak**
John C. Morrison III""
and Mary K. Weeks'"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses significant judicial and legislative developments
of interest to the Georgia trial practitioner occurring during the survey
period of this publication.'

* Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. University of the South (BA, magna cum laude, 1998); Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2002). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. Auburn University (B.S.B.A., 2001); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D.,
magna cum laude, 2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. The Citadel (B.S., summa cum laude, 2001); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. Mercer University (BA, magna cum laude, 2003); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2006). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. University of Kentucky (BA, summa cum laude, 1999); Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2007). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia trial practice and procedure law during the prior survey
period, see Kate S. Cook et al., Trial Practiceand Procedure,Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 61 MERCER L. REv. 363 (2009).
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II. LEGISLATION
Georgia Senate Bill 344' amended section 31-8-195.1 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)r to extend sovereign immunity to
physicians' assistants working in "safety net clinics."' The initial act
only extended immunity to physicians and nurses.5
Georgia Senate Bill 491" has been enacted to affect service of process'
in the following ways: (1) it allows process servers to be certified statewide;8 (2) it requires process servers to be admitted into gated and
cecured communities for purposes of effecting service;' and perhaps
most importantly, (3) it requires proof of service to be made within five
business days of service.o If proof of service is not timely made, the
time a party has to answer is now tolled until the proof of service is
filed."
The Georgia General Assembly recently enacted Georgia Senate Bill
138,12 which added a new code section that prohibits the implicit
finding of any private right of action from any act that is enacted after
July 1, 2010.'" Tb narrow the potentially broad ramifications of
subpart (a) of the added code section, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-8," subpart (b) of
the added section provides that the statute cannot
be construed to prevent the breach of any duty imposed by law from
being used as the basis for a cause of action under any theory of
recovery otherwise recognized by law, including, but not limited to,
theories of recovery under the law of torts or contract or for breach of

2. Ga. S. Bill 344, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 209 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 31-8-195.1
(Supp. 2010)).
3. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-195.1 (2009 & Supp. 2010).
4. Ga. S. Bill 344 at § 1, 2010 Ga. Laws at 209.
5. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-195.1(a)-(b) (2009) (amended 2010).
6. Ga. S. Bill 491, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 822 (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 9-10-91, 911-4, 9-11-4.1 (Supp. 2010)).
7. Senate Bill 491 also allows Georgia superior courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents in domestic relations cases. Id. at § 1, 2010 Ga. Laws at 823 (codified
at O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(5) (Supp. 2010)).
8. Ga. S. Bill 491 at § 5, 2010 Ga. Laws at 825 (codified at O.C.GA § 9-11-4.1(a)
(Supp. 2010)).
9. Id. at § 3, 2010 Ga. Laws at 824 (codified at O.C.GA. 9-11-4(f)(4) (Supp. 2010)).
10. Id. at § 4, 2010 Ga. Laws at 825 (codified at O.C.GA § 9-11-4(b) (Supp. 2010)).
11. Id.
12. Ga. S. Bill 138, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 745 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-2-8 (Supp.
2010)).
13. Id. at § 2, 2010 Ga. Laws at 745 (codified at O.C.GA § 9-2-8(a) (Supp. 2010)).
14. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-8 (Supp. 2010).
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legal or private duties as set forth in Code Sections 51-1-6 and 51-1-8
or in Title 13.s

III.

CASE LAw

Voluntary Dismissals, Service of Process, and Notice Issues
Although the exhaustive opinion of the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Resource Life Insurance Co. v. Bucknerl6 is a must-read for lawyers
practicing in the field of consumer class actions, it also provides
clarification on the issues of when and under what terms presuit notice
is required in the individual and class action context. Plaintiff Buckner
filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that she and a class of similarly
situated insureds did not receive their refund of unearned credit
insurance premiums when their insured automobile loans terminated
early." The credit life and disability insurance products at issue in
Resource Life were single-premium, meaning the entire premium was
paid up front and fully earned by the defendant only if the insured loan
ran to term."8 The plaintiff alleged that if the loans did not run to
term, the defendant should refund those premiums that had been paid
but could never be earned by the defendant.'
The defendant countered by arguing that it had no obligation to issue
refunds to its insureds until each insured provided it with written notice
of that insured's entitlement to a refund; consequently, the defendant
moved for partial summary judgment on that issue.o The genesis of
the defendant's argument was a statement in its credit insurance
certificate that "[i]f the insurance stops before the end of the Term of
Insurance, We will on written notice refund any unearned premium."2 1
The trial court denied the defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment and granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification.' On
interlocutory appeal,' a unanimous panel of the court of appeals
rejected the defendants argument that the language, "on written notice,"
constituted a mandatory condition precedent that had to be satisfied by

A

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
a class

Ga. S. Bill 138 at § 2, 2010 Ga. Laws at 745 (codified at O.C.GA § 9-2-8(b)).
304 Ga. App. 719, 698 S.E.2d 19 (2010).
Id. at 719, 721, 698 S.E.2d at 22-24.
See id. at 719-20, 698 S.E.2d at 23.
See id. at 721, 698 S.E.2d at 24.
Id. at 720-21, 698 S.E.2d at 23-24.
Id.
Id. at 721-22, 698 S.E.2d at 24.
See generally O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(g) (2006) (stating that "a court's order certifying
... shall be appealable in the same manner as a final order").
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each of its insureds whose loans had terminated early and who were
thus owed a refund of an unearned premium by the defendant. '
The court explained that the "on written notice" language in the
defendant's insurance certificates did not constitute a condition
precedent because the certificates did not state that the insureds would
forfeit their unearned insurance premiums if they failed to provide
written notice." The court further held that "under Georgia law, policy
language such as that at issue, which does nothing more than require
the insured to give notice of a particular event, is insufficient to create
Going one step further, the court noted that
a condition precedent.'
even if the certificates' notice provision was a condition precedent, "the
filing of the class action itself was sufficient to provide Resource Life
with the requisite notice as to the claims of the putative class members."" After dispensing with the defendant's primary argument in
opposition to class certification, the court likewise affirmed the trial
court's class certification order." This opinion thus makes clear that
by filing a class action, a class representative can satisfy any notice
required of absent class members.

In Boca Petroco, Inc. v. Petroleum Realty II," the Georgia Supreme
Court issued a noteworthy opinion that addresses the right to file a
notice of lis pendensso pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-610" against
Georgia properties potentially compromised by out-of-state litigation. In
Boca underlying litigation was commenced in Florida that concerned
property and leasehold rights for various gas stations and convenience
stores located in several different Georgia counties. Boca filed notices
of lis pendens in the superior court of each respective county where the
property at issue was located, and the property owner, Petroleum Realty,
filed petitions to cancel those notices. 2 The varying superior courts
were split concerning the validity of such notices.' The supreme court
held that lis pendens notices could not be filed to give notice of out-ofstate litigation, reasoning that although the ability to file a notice of lis

24. Resource Life, 304 Ga. App. at 726, 698 S.E.2d at 27.
25. Id. at 726-27, 698 S.E.2d at 27.
26. Id. at 727, 698 S.E.2d at 27-28.
27. Id. at 727, 698 S.E.2d at 28.
28. Id. at 728, 734, 698 S.E.2d at 29, 32.
29. 285 Ga. 487, 678 S.E.2d 330 (2009).
30. The purpose of lis pendens "is to inform prospective purchasers that real property
is directly involved in a pending lawsuit, in which lawsuit there is some relief sought in
regard to that particular property." Id. at 488, 678 S.E.2d at 332.
31. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-610 (2002).
32. Boca, 285 Ga. at 487-88, 678 S.E.2d at 331-32.
33. See id. at 488, 678 S.E.2d at 332.
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pendens has been codified,' "Georgia continues to require a showing
of the common law elements of lis pendens before finding that litigation
gives rise to a valid lis pendens for which notice may be filed."' As the
supreme court explained, these common law elements include the
requirement that a court have jurisdiction of both the person and the
subject matter of the suit.' The supreme court agreed with the court
of appeals that because "one state does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over real property in another state and cannot directly affect
the title of property in another state," the common law elements
justifying filing a notice of lis pendens could not be satisfied in this
case. 37
Lastly, in Retention Alternatives, Ltd. v. Hayward" the supreme
court affirmed the assurance of the court of appeals that a plaintiff may
still rely on Stout v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.39 to timely serve an
uninsured motorist carrier (UMC) for the first time in a renewal action
following a voluntary dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d)a against
the tortfeasor.' In so holding, the supreme court rejected the appellant
TMC's contention that Stout was invalidated when O.C.GA. § 33-7-1142
was amended subsequent to the Stout decision. 3
B. Damages
In Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, PC. v. Nestlehutt," the supreme
The statute was
court held O.C.G.A. § 51-13-15 unconstitutional.'

34. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-610.
35. Boca, 285 Ga. at 487, 489, 678 S.E.2d at 331-32 (quoting Boca Petroco, Inc. v.
Petroleum Realty II, 292 Ga. App. 833, 835, 666 S.E.2d 12, 14 (2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
36. Id. at 489, 678 S.E.2d at 333.
37. See id. at 489-90,492,678 S.E.2d at 333-34 (quoting Boca Petroco, Inc. v. Petroleum
Realty II, 292 Ga. App. 833, 838, 666 S.E.2d 12, 15 (2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But see id. at 492-95,678 S.E.2d at 334-36 (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (questioning
whether the majority opinion will obstruct filings of lis pendens notices between Georgia
counties).
38. 285 Ga. 437, 678 S.E.2d 877 (2009).
39. 269 Ga. 611, 502 S.E.2d 226 (1998).
40. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d) (2000 & Supp. 2010).
41. See 285 Ga. at 439-40, 678 S.E.2d at 879.
42. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2000 & Supp. 2010).
43. Hayward, 285 Ga. at 440, 678 S.E.2d at 879.
44. 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (2010).
45. O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 (Supp. 2010).
46. Atlanta Oculoplastic, 286 Ga. at 731, 691 S.E.2d at 220.
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enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of 2005,'' and it capped
noneconomic damage awards in medical malpractice cases.' In Atlanta
Oculoplastic,after receiving a $1,265,000 verdict in a medical malpractice case, the Nestlehutts moved to have O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 declared
unconstitutional because the statute would have required an $800,000
reduction in the jury's verdict. The trial court granted the motion after
finding that O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 violated the Georgia Constitution's
guarantee of the right to a trial by jury.9 The trial court entered a
judgment for the Nestlehutts in the full amount of the jury verdict and
denied the appellants' motion for a new trial. An appeal to the supreme
court ensued."
After tracing the history of the claims and damages involved, the
supreme court concluded,
[Alt the time of the adoption of our Constitution of 1798, there did exist
the common law right to a jury trial for claims involving the negligence
of a health care provider, with an attendant right to the award of the
full measure of damages, including noneconomic damages, as determined by the jury."
The supreme court then determined that the damages cap in "[O.C.G.A.]
§ 51-13-1 clearly nullifies the jury's findings of fact regarding damages
and thereby undermines the jury's basic function," infringing upon a
party's constitutional right to a jury determination as to noneconomic
damages." The supreme court, therefore, held the law unconstitutional
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court." The supreme court also
determined that its decision would apply retroactively after considering
a flexible, three-factor test.'

47. Ga. S. Bill 3, § 13, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1, 16-17 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 51-131).
48. O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1(b)-(e).
49. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 11(a); see Atlanta Oculoplastic,286 Ga. at 731-32, 691
S.E.2d at 220-21.
50. Atlanta Oculoplastic, 286 Ga. at 731, 691 S.E.2d at 220.
51. Id. at 733-35, 691 S.E.2d at 221-23.
52. Id. at 735, 691 S.E.2d at 223.
53. Id. at 740, 691 S.E.2d at 226.
54. See id. at 738-40, 691 S.E.2d at 225-26. Justices Melton, Nahmias, Carley, and
Hines did not concur in the portion of the majority's decision regarding retroactivity. Id.
at 740, 691 S.E.2d at 226. In a special concurrence authored by Justice Nahmias and
joined by Justices Carley and Hines, Justice Nahmias questioned the application of the test
the majority used to reach its result, noting that the Supreme Court of the United States
had disapproved of the test in its later decisions and that "selective and flexible retroactive
application of our decisions" was undesirable. Id at 740-45, 691 S.E.2d at 226-29
(Nahmias, J., concurring specially).
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C. Dismissal ofActions/Summary Judgment
The plaintiff in Naik v. Booker' filed a wrongful death action after
the decedent Helen Robinson died of internal bleeding that was not
detected or stopped by the defendant doctor. In his initial affidavit, the
plaintiffs expert witness opined to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the decedent would have survived if the defendant doctor
had identified and surgically repaired the decedent's hemorrhage.
During his deposition, however, the plaintiff's expert witness opined that
he could not say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that surgical
intervention would more likely than not have saved the decedent's
life."
Relying on precedent from the supreme court, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant doctor's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of proximate causation because
"[contradictions [in expert witness testimony] go solely to the expert's
credibility, and are to be assessed by the jury when weighing the
expert's testimony."' Thus, the opinion in Naik confirms that when
expert testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact, a motion for
summary judgment should be denied, even if that expert testimony is
later contradicted. This opinion preserves the jury's time-honored role
of weighing contradictory evidence, even if that contradictory evidence
happens to come from the same witness.

D. Special Masters
In 2009 the Georgia General Assembly enacted Georgia Uniform
Superior Court Rule 46," which authorizes a court to appoint a special
master to perform virtually any duty or task normally done by the
court. 9 Prior to the enactment of Rule 46, there was no statutory
authority for the appointment of a special master except in limited,
specific cases.' The new rule sets out a number of procedural requirements for the appointment of a special master, the qualifications of a
special master, the scope of the special master's authority, and the

55. 303 Ga. App. 282, 692 S.E.2d 855 (2010).
56. Id. at 282-84, 692 S.E.2d at 855-56.
57. Id. at 286-87, 692 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting Thompson v. Ezor, 272 Ga. 849,853, 536
S.E.2d 749, 753 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 46.
59. See GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R 46(aXl).
60. For example, O.C.G.A. § 9-7-1 (2007) provides for the appointment of an "auditor,"
which could function similarly to a special master. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Waters, 298 Ga. App. 843, 845, 681 S.E.2d 651, 653 (2009).
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court's adoption of the special master's findings."' This Article will not
discuss each of the provisions of the new rule but will instead comment
on some of the interesting provisions therein.6 2
While the authority that may be granted to a special master is broad
and diverse, the order appointing the special master must state the
duties assigned and any limits on the special master's authority, as well
as a number of details about the special master's role.' The master
has authority "to regulate all proceedings and take all appropriate
measures to perform fairly and efficiently all assigned duties" unless the
order appointing the master directs otherwise." Thus, if a party wants
the master's authority limited in any way, he or she must ensure that
the limitation is stated in the appointment order. The only other
limitation on the master's authority is that the master may not impose
contempt sanctions against a party (or any sanction against a nonparty),
but the master may recommend such sanctions to the court."
The master must make rather detailed reports to the court on "all
motions submitted by the parties.'" Once an order or report is entered
by the master, the court must afford the parties an opportunity to object
to any portion of the order, and the party is entitled to be heard on the
objection.67 Unless stipulated otherwise, all findings of fact and
conclusions of law that the master made or recommended are reviewed
anew by the court-"[tlhe court must decide de novo all objections."68
Thus, it is likely that the appointment of a special master will only slow
down the administration of justice. It is to be expected that a special
master will most often be appointed in hotly contested and complicated
cases.69 However, it is in such cases that the parties are least likely to
agree to anything and object to everything. A contumacious party may
object to everything the special master orders, forcing the trial court to
review everything de novo, essentially relitigating all decided issues.
Obviously, such a procedure does not expedite justice. Thus, practitio-

61. See GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 46.
62. See E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Waters, 287 Ga. 235, 695 S.E.2d 265 (2010),
for further discussion of the requirements of appointing a special master under the newly
enacted Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rule 46.
63. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 46(bX2).
64. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 46(c).
65. Id.
66. GA. UNIP. SuPER. OT. K 46(fXi).
67. GA. UNIF. SUPER. Or. R. 46(gXl).
68. GA. UNIF. SuPE. CT. R. 46(gX3)-(4) (emphasis added). A master's ruling on
procedural matters may be set aside for an abuse of discretion. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R.
46(gX5).
69. See, e.g., E.L DuPontDe Nemours & Co., 287 Ga. at 237, 695 S.E.2d at 267.
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ners must carefully consider the effect of appointing a special master
before suggesting or consenting to such an appointment.
E. Defenses
In Baker v. Harcon, Inc., 0 the court of appeals reversed a trial court
order granting summary judgment to a construction subcontractor on the
issue of whether the plaintiff construction supervisor had equal
knowledge of, and assumed the risk of falling into, a large trash chute
One interesting part of the
in an unfinished commercial project."
opinion in Baker is that the injured plaintiff instructed the defendant's
employees to construct a trash chute in the very location where he was
injured. The plaintiff then returned to the construction project weeks
later with a crew to clean up the concrete floor that the defendant had
framed."
As the plaintiff and his crew were cleaning, he and a fellow worker
observed a large piece of plywood with a few loose pieces of smaller wood
lying on the newly poured concrete floor. The plaintiff then went to pick
up the loose plywood, and while he was doing so, he fell through the
trash chute. The plaintiff severely injured himself and was rendered
totally and permanently disabled."
The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that (1) the plaintiff
had equal knowledge of the danger created by the trash chute but failed
to avoid it, and (2) the plaintiff assumed the risk of falling into the
chute.74
Authoring the majority opinion of the en banc court, the late Judge
Bernes conceded that the plaintiff had originally known about the
existence of the trash chute.' The court of appeals nevertheless held
that a jury question existed as to whether the plaintiff had equal
knowledge of the danger and exercised ordinary care because the
plaintiff was supervising the construction of several similar buildings
during the same time period, none of which had trash chutes.7 ' The
court further noted the plaintiffs testimony that when the plaintiff fell,
the interior of the building looked much different than it had earlier
when the plaintiff gave the defendant's employees instructions about

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

303 Ga. App. 749, 694 S.E.2d 673 (2010).
Id. at 749-51, 694 S.E.2d at 675-76.
Id. at 750-51, 694 S.E.2d at 676.
Id.
See id. at 751, 694 S.E.2d at 677.
See id. at 753, 694 S.E.2d at 677.
Id. at 753, 694 S.E.2d at 677-78.
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where to place the trash chute." Perhaps more importantly, the court
explained that the defendant's act of simply covering the chute up with
a scrap piece of plywood violated both Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) regulations' and industry standards and may
have concealed the danger.'
It was a much easier task to reverse the trial court's ruling that the
plaintiff had assumed the risk of falling into the trash chute. The court
explained,
[A] plaintiff's comprehension or general understanding of nonspecific
risks that might be associated with the activity at issue is not
sufficient. Rather, "fi]n its simplest and primary sense, assumption of
the risk means that the plaintiff, in advance, has given his consent to
relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to
take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the
defendant is to do or leave undone."'
Because there was no undisputed evidence that the plaintiff in Baker
fully understood and appreciated the risk that caused his specific injury,
and because he did not consent to being injured by falling through a
trash chute that had been covered with scrap plywood, the court of
appeals reversed the trial court's decision and held there was insufficient
evidence to rule as a matter of law that the plaintiff had assumed the
risk that caused his injury.81

F. Bad Faith,Settlements, and Offers of Settlement
In Smith v. Baptiste,82 the supreme court affirmed the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68,1 Georgia's Offer of Settlement statute,"
which was enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of 2 0 0 5 .' In
Baptiste the trial court found O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 unconstitutional on the
grounds that it impeded tort litigants' right of access to the courts in
contravention of article I, section I, paragraph XII of the Georgia
Constitution." In a five-two decision, the supreme court reversed the

77. Id.
78. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(aX3) (2010).
79. Baker, 303 Ga. App. at 752, 694 S.E.2d at 677.
80. Id. at 754-55,694 S.E.2d at 678-79 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864, 471 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1996)).
81. Id. at 755-56, 694 S.E.2d at 679.
82. 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E.2d 83 (2010).
83. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (2006).
84. Baptiste, 287 Ga. at 28-29, 694 S.E.2d at 87-88.
85. Ga. S. Bill 3 at § 5, 2005 Ga. Laws at 5-7.
86. 287 Ga. at 24, 694 S.E.2d at 85.
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trial court, reasoning that the Georgia Constitution only provides a right
of choice to self-representation, not a right of access to the courts."
The majority also rejected the trial court's ruling that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68
violated the Georgia Constitution on the grounds that "it permits the
recovery of attorney's fees absent the prerequisite showings of either
[O.C.G.A.] § 9-15-14 or § 13-6-11," or that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 violates the
Georgia Constitution's uniformity clause."
With the question of O.C.GA § 9-11-68's constitutionality settled, the
court of appeals considered, as a matter of first impression, how an offer
to settle "[sltate[s] with particularity any relevant conditions," so as to
comply with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a)(4)." In Great West Casualty Co. v.
Bloomfield,' the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs contention that
an offer to settle must include or attach a copy of the specific release
language upon which the offer is conditioned.9 1 Instead, the court of
appeals held that a "statement of a condition to a settlement agreement
requiring the execution of a release" meets the requirements of O.C.GA.
§ 9-11-68(a)(4) so long as the statement is specific enough "to render the
settlement agreement enforceable under Georgia law."'
In Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brightman," the supreme
court left open the issue of under what circumstances an insurer can
offer to settle a claim against its insured and take advantage of the "safe
harbor" exception to bad faith litigation." However, in Fortner v.
Grange Mutual Insurance Co.,' the supreme court clarified that the
safe harbor exception does not apply when the insurer conditions its
offer to settle upon a full release, dismissal with prejudice, or indemnification on behalf of its insured when the insured has potential unresolved
exposure under multiple insurance policies." In Fortner the plaintiff
was injured in a vehicular collision caused by the defendants insured,
who had an automobile policy with the defendant as well as separate

87. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 87. But see id. at 42-46, 694 S.E.2d at 96-99 (Hunstein,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Benham also joined Chief Justice Hunstein's dissent. Id. at 46,
694 S.E.2d at 99.
88. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 87-88. See generally O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2006); O.C.G.A.
§ 13-6-11 (2010).
89. Great W. Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield, 303 Ga. App. 26, 27-28, 693 S.E.2d 99, 100-01
(2010) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. 303 Ga. App. 26, 693 S.E.2d 99 (2010).
91. See id. at 28, 693 S.E.2d at 101.
92. Id.
93. 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519 (2003).
94. See id. at 687, 580 S.E.2d at 522.
95. 286 Ga. 189, 686 S.E.2d 93 (2009).
96. See id. at 191, 686 S.E.2d at 95.
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liability coverage with another insurer. Both policies potentially
provided insurance coverage for the plaintiffs damages. The defendant
eventually offered its policy limits but conditioned acceptance on a full
indemnification and release of its insured as well as a dismissal with
prejudice.' The plaintiff, who had not reached any settlement with the
insurance company holding the tortfeasor's other applicable policy, could
not agree to the defendant's terms without risking foregoing recovery
under the other policy." The supreme court held that the safe harbor
exception did not apply to the defendant's offer of settlement, noting that
[o]therwise, if two or more insurers are involved in a case and the
plaintiff makes a settlement offer to one insurer that conditions
settlement on another insurer also settling, the first insurer could, as
a matter of law, avoid a bad faith claim by offering its policy limits but
making the offer contingent on unreasonable conditions that a plaintiff
is guaranteed to reject."

G. Arbitration
The court of appeals issued two noteworthy arbitration decisions
during the survey period. In Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. JamesBrookfield, LLC, the court of appeals concluded that the bases for
judicial review set forth in the Georgia Arbitration Code'0o could not
The case involved a lease agreement that
be expanded by contract."
purported to give the trial court the ability to vacate an arbitration
award if the award "is not consistent with applicable law" or satisfied
the grounds specified for vacatur in the Arbitration Code." As a
matter of first impression,'" the court concluded "that the Arbitration
Code does not permit contracting parties who provide for arbitration of
disputes to contractually expand the scope of judicial review that is
authorized by statute."" The court found that contractual expansion
of the grounds for vacatur "would frustrate both the prompt resolution
of arbitrated disputes and the finality of arbitration awards.""o The

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 189, 686 S.E.2d at 94.
See id. at 191, 686 S.E.2d at 95.
Id.
299 Ga. App. 614, 683 S.E.2d 40 (2009).
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-1 to -18 (2007 & Supp. 2010).
299 Ga. App. at 617-19, 683 S.E.2d at 43-45.
Id at 615, 683 S.E.2d at 42.
Id. at 618, 683 S.E.2d at 44.
Id. at 617, 683 S.E.2d at 43.
Id. at 618, 683 S.E.2d at 44.
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supreme court has since affirmed the court of appeals decision,'0 and
it appears settled that the "statutory grounds provide the exclusive basis
for vacatur."'os
In Life Care Centers of America v. Smith,"es the court of appeals
determined the effect of a health care power of attorney on an arbitration agreement."1o Angela Smith had her mother, Gerith Petereit,
admitted to a Life Care Center after Petereit suffered a stroke."'
Smith executed a number of documents on her mother's behalf under the
authority of a "Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care," which
permitted Smith "to make any and all decisions for [Petereit] concerning
[her] personal care, medical treatment, hospitalization, and health care
and to require, withhold, or withdraw any type of medical treatment or
procedure, even though [her] death may ensue."n' One of the documents Smith signed on her mother's behalf was an arbitration agreement. Petereit died as a result of a head injury she received while at the
Life Care Center, and Life Care attempted to compel arbitration of the
wrongful death claim brought by Smith."
The court of appeals held "that the plain language of the health care
power of attorney did not give Smith the power to sign away her
mother's or her mother's legal representative's right to a jury trial.""'
The court observed that the agreement to arbitrate was optional, and
that Smith was not required to sign it as a condition of her mother's
admission into the Life Care Center."' Noting that there was no
Georgia authority directly on point, the court examined persuasive

107. Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 287 Ga. 408,413,696
S.E.2d 663, 667 (2010).
108. Brookfield Country Club, 299 Ga. App. at 617, 683 S.E.2d at 44.
109. 298 Ga. App. 739, 681 S.E.2d 182 (2009).
110. Id. at 739, 681 S.E.2d at 183-84. In a related case heard at the same time by the
court of appeals, Life Care argued that Smith's counsel, John Mabrey, had executed a
settlement agreement under which he was precluded from pursuing claims against Life
Care for three years. Life Care did not file a motion to disqualify Mabrey but instead
sought to compel arbitration to enforce the prior settlement agreement, thereby removing
counsel from the presently pending case. Id. at 744, 681 S.E.2d at 186-87. The trial court
rejected Life Care's argument, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 744-45, 681 S.E.2d
at 187. The court determined that "[bleyond conclusory allegations, Life Care has not
shown that Mabrey has violated any provision in the agreement merely by accepting Smith
as a client." Id. at 745, 681 S.E.2d at 187. The court noted that although a claim by Life
Care against Mabrey for breach of the settlement agreement may exist, there was no
evidence of such claim before the court. Id.
111. Id. at 739, 681 S.E.2d at 184.
112. Id. at 740, 681 8.E.2d at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at 739-40, 681 S.E.2d at 184.
114. Id. at 742, 681 S.E.2d at 185.
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authority from other states, which suggested "that a health care power
of attorney was insufficient to bind the principal."n' Accordingly, the
court concluded that the trial court correctly found that Smith was not
authorized to bind her mother to arbitration based on the health care
power of attorney alone."

H. Class Actions
In a matter of first impression,' the court of appeals considered the
requirement in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(c)(1)119 that a trial court issue a
class certification order "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement
In Fuller v. Heartwood 11, LLC,' 2 1 the
of ... a class action.""
plaintiff filed his putative class action in March 2004, but through a
series of defense motions, stays, and stipulations, he did not file his
written motion for class certification until January 2006. This written
motion, due to another series of stays, motions, and the transfer of the
case to a new presiding judge, was not ruled upon until March 2009, at
which time the new judge denied the motion for class certification as
untimely under the terms of the above statute. Although the order
denying class certification expressly found that the five-year delay
unduly prejudiced the parties, the order did not explain the trial court's
The court of appeals reversed this
grounds for this conclusion."
ruling, holding that neither O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23 nor any pertinent
Georgia case imposes a definite time period by which a motion for class
The court of appeals further elaborated
certification must be filed.'
that the legislative intent of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(c)(1) was for "trial courts
to actively manage class certification matters" and to "place[] a shared
obligation upon the litigants and the court to ensure that the question
The court of appeals
of class certification is timely resolved."'12
concluded that
[i]n the absence of a local rule governing the timely filing of a motion
for class certification, a court may not deny an otherwise proper motion
solely on the basis that it was untimely. Rather, the court must

116.
117.
118.
(2009).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id at 743, 681 S.E.2d at 186.
Id. at 744, 681 S.E.2d at 186.
See Fuller v. Heartwood 11, LLC, 301 Ga. App. 309, 312, 687 S.E.2d 287, 290
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(cX) (2006).
Fuller, 301 Ga. App. at 311, 687 S.E.2d at 290; see O.C.GA § 9-11-23(c)(1).
301 Ga. App. 309, 687 S.E.2d 287 (2009).
Id. at 309-11, 687 S.E.2d at 289-90.
See id. at 311-12, 687 S.E.2d at 290.
Id. at 312-13, 687 S.E.2d at 290-91.
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determine. . . whether the delay resulted in any actual prejudice to the
litigants or to the class. Then, in its order on the motion for class
certification, the court shall set forth in writing factual findings
supporting its decision.'

I. Statutes of Limitation
In Deen v. Egleston, D.M.D.,'m the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia held O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(b)127 unconstitutional as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" and certified the case for interlocutory appeal.'
O.C.GA § 9-3-73(b) contains an anti-tolling provision that excepts
medical malpractice actions brought by certain persons from the tolling
provisions of O.C.GA H§ 9-3-90'3 and 9-3-91.1' Namely, it excepts
medical malpractice actions brought by mentally incompetent and
certain minor victimss32 who did not leave unrepresented estates,'133
whose causes of action do not involve the leaving of foreign objects in the
body,'" and whose claims are not asserted as part of a contribution
action."
Thus, when the district court held O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(b)
unconstitutional, those persons enjoyed a brief respite from that
exception. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73(b) survives rational basis scrutiny.136

J. Jury Instructions
In an important decision for medical negligence trial practice, the
Georgia Supreme Court in Smith v. Finch" disapproved "of the so-

125. Id. at 313-14, 687 S.E.2d at 291-92. The court of appeals expressly enumerated
the following nonexclusive, legitimate reasons for delay: (1) resolving individual dispositive
legal issues and (2) conducting discovery regarding issues pertinent to class certification.
Id. at 314, 687 S.E.2d at 292.
126. 601 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Ga. 2009).
127. O.C.GA § 9-3-73(b) (2007).
128. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. Deen, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-47.
130. O.C.GA § 9-3-90 (2007).
131. O.C.GA § 9-3-91 (2007).
132. O.C.GA § 9-3-73(b).
133. See O.C.GA § 9-3-92 (2007).
134. O.C.GA § 9-3-73(e) (2007).
135. Cf O.C.GA § 51-12-32(b) (2000) (requiring joint tortfeasors be held liable for
contribution when a judgment is entered against all joint tortfeasors but is satisfied by only
one).
136. Deen v. Egleston, D.M.D., 597 F.3d 1223, 1238 (11th Cir. 2010).
137. 285 Ga. 709, 681 S.E.2d 147 (2009).
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called 'hindsight' jury instruction," which stated in relevant part:
"Negligence consists of not foreseeing and guarding against that which
is probable and likely to happen, not against that which is only remotely
and slightly possible."" The court held that that sentence "is not a
correct statement of Georgia law as to the standard of care" because it
"is plainly inconsistent with the medical decision-making process, which
often requires the consideration of unlikely but serious consequences in
the diagnosis and treatment of disease."" The court also recognized
the charge was "generally inconsistent with the standard for foreseeability in our negligence law.""4 The court also disapproved as "duplicative" another sentence in the charge that states, "In other words, the
concept of negligence does not include hindsight."""'
In another medical malpractice case, the supreme court overruled
prior court of appeals precedent and held that a jury instruction on the
informed consent doctrine was not warranted in chiropractic cases." 2
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court reasoned that
informed consent in Georgia "is defined . . . exclusively by statutes and
regulations." 4 3 Therefore, because "chiropractic treatments are not
among the procedures designated in [O.C.G.A.I § 31-9-6.1 for which
informed consent is required," the court held that "the trial court
correctly refused to instruct the jury on the informed consent doctrine."" The curious result of this decision is that it apparently limits
a patient's right to be informed of the risks of treatment they will receive
unless that type of treatment or risk is expressly covered by Georgia's
statutory scheme. The decision suggests the wisdom of the General
Assembly revising the statutory scheme to add a broad recognition of a
patient's right to be informed of medical treatment risks, as opposed to
a specific laundry list of treatments that will inexplicably leave certain
patients (such as those visiting chiropractors) with no right of informed
consent.

138. Id. at 709-10,681 S.E.2d at 148-49. See generally CouNcIL oF SUPER. CT. JUDGES,
I GA. SUGGESTED PATrERN JURY INSTRUIONS: CIVIL CASES § 62.311 (4th ed. 2004).
139. Smith, 285 Ga. at 710, 681 S.E.2d at 149.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 710, 712, 681 S.E.2d at 149-51.
142. See Blotner v. Doreika, 285 Ga. 481, 485, 678 S.E.2d 80, 83 (2009).
143. Id. at 484, 678 S.E.2d at 82.
144. 285 Ga. at 484-85, 678 S.E.2d at 82-83. See generallyO.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1 (2009).
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K. Immunity and Heightened Evidentiary Standards
In Gliemmo v. Cousineau," Carol and Robert Gliemmo brought a
medical malpractice action against emergency room physician Mark
Cousineau, Emergency Medical Specialists of Columbus, P.C., and St.
Francis Hospital.'" After the complaint in the case was filed, the
Gliemmos filed a constitutional challenge to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c),
which was enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of 2005," and
provides,
In an action involving a health care liability claim arising out of the
provision of emergency medical care in a hospital emergency department or obstetrical unit or in a surgical suite immediately following the

evaluation or treatment of a patient in a hospital emergency department, no physician or health care provider shall be held liable unless
it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the physician or

health care provider's actions showed gross negligence."
The trial court rejected the Gliemmos' constitutional challenge but
certified its decision for immediate review. 5 o The supreme court
granted the Gliemmos' application for interlocutory review.'
Appellants first argued that O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) was "a special law
that violates the uniformity clause of the Georgia Constitution because
it sets forth a gross negligence standard of liability only for certain
emergency care providers.""' The court observed that "[tlo violate
[this] constitutional provision, the statute in question must either be a
general law which lacks uniform operation throughout the state or a
special law for which provision has been made by existing general

145. 287 Ga. 7, 694 S.E.2d 75 (2010).
146. Id. at 7, 694 S.E.2d at 77.
147. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) (Supp. 2010).
148. Ga. S. Bill 3 at § 10, 2005 Ga. Laws at 11-13.
149. Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 7, 694 S.E.2d at 77; see O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c).
150. Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 7, 694 S.E.2d at 77.
151. Id. at 7-8, 694 S.E.2d at 77.
152. Id. at 8, 694 S.E.2d at 77. The uniformity clause of the Georgia Constitution
provides,
Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state and
no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been
made by an existing general law, except that the General Assembly may by
general law authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution to
exercise police powers which do not conflict with general laws.
GA. CONST. art. M, § 6, para. 4(a).
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law."'" The court first addressed whether O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) was
a general or a special law, noting that special laws typically "deal[] with
a limited activity in a specific industry during a limited time frame."'
The court then compared O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) to the Hospital Care for
Pregnant Women Act,'" which also requires a "gross negligence"
The court
standard of care for certain health care providers.1"
observed that it had previously rejected a claim that the Hospital Care
for Pregnant Women Act was a special law because the statute "operates
statewide and is applicable to all hospitals authorized to operate as
provided in the statute.""' The court held that like the Hospital Care
for Pregnant Women Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) "operates uniformly
upon all health care liability claims arising from emergency medical care
as provided in the statute" and does not create an arbitrary or unreasonable classification." 8 Thus, the court held that O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c)
is a general law that complies with the uniformity clause.'
The court likewise rejected the Gliemmos' remaining constitutional
challenges, first addressing the Gliemmos' contention that O.C.G.A. § 511-29.5(c) violates the equal protection clause of the Georgia Constitutionm because it applies only to malpractice actions originating from
emergency medical care provided in a hospital emergency department.'' The court held that the statute did not violate equal protection principles because it did not deprive litigants of any fundamental
rights and bore a reasonable relationship to legitimate legislative
goals. 162 The court also rejected the Gliemmos' contention that the
term "gross negligence" was unconstitutionally vague, holding that the
term has a commonly understood meaning and was, therefore, not

153. Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 8, 694 S.E.2d at 77 (quoting Lasseter v. Ga. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 253 Ga. 227, 229, 319 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1984)) (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. (quoting Lasseter v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 253 Ga. 227, 229,319 S.E.2d 824,
827 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. O.C.G.A. H0 31-8-40 to -46 (2009).
156. Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 8-9, 694 S.E.2d at 77-78. See generally O.C.GA § 31-8-44.
157. Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 9, 694 S.E.2d at 77 (quoting Terrell Cnty. v. Albany/Dougherty Hosp. Auth., 256 Ga. 627, 629, 352 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
158. Id at 9, 694 S.E.2d at 78.
159. Id. at 10, 694 S.E.2d at 78. The court also determined that as a general law,
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) could not violate the provision in the Georgia Constitution that
prohibits special laws, GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4(c). Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 10, 694
S.E.2d at 78-79.
160. GA. CONsT. art. I, § 1, para. 2.
161. Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 10, 694 S.E.2d at 79.
162. Id. at 11-12, 694 S.E.2d at 79-80.
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required to be defined by statute." The court also determined that
the Gliemmos failed to raise a constitutional vagueness challenge to the
definition of "emergency medical care" in the trial court; as such, the
court declined to address the issue on appeal."e
In Krachman v. Ridgeview Institute, Inc.,' the court of appeals
expressly resolved the longstanding conflict between the supreme court's
holding in Gilbert v. Richardson'" and the court of appeals holdings
in Etheridge v. CharterPeachford Hospital,Inc." and Poss v. Department of Human Resources." In the latter two cases, the court of
appeals had extended the immunity conferred to certain healthcare
workers and other persons by O.C.G.A. § 3 7 -3-4i" to the hospitals and
other healthcare facilities that employ such workers."'o Regarding the
extension of immunity, in Krachman the court of appeals overruled both
Etheridge and Poss as inconsistent with Gilbert and held that a
reasonable reading of O.C.GA § 37-3-4's plain text could not provide
such immunity for hospitals or other mental health facilities."

163. Id. at 12, 694 S.E.2d at 80.
164. Id. at 13, 694 S.E.2d at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Benham
dissented in Gliemmo and was joined by Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson.
Id. (Benham, J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the majority's characterization
of O.C.GA § 51-1-29.5(c) as a special law and questioned the majority's reliance on Terrell
County, observing that the gross negligence standard of care was not specifically at issue
in that case. See Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 13-16, 694 S.E.2d at 80-82. Further, the dissent
argued that O.C.GA § 51-1-27 (2000), which prescribes a "reasonable care" standard of
care for medical malpractice claims, was a general law that should preclude enactment of
special legislation such as O.C.GA § 51-1-29.5(c) under the uniformity clause. Gliemmo,
287 Ga. at 16-17, 694 S.E.2d at 82-83. Finally, the dissent argued that O.C.GA. § 51-129.5(c) was unconstitutional because it arbitrarily and unreasonably protected some health
care providers and not others; for example, the statute would not protect a health care
provider that provided emergency assistance in an ambulance rather than an emergency
room. Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 17-18, 694 S.E.2d at 83.
165. 301 Ga. App. 361, 687 S.E.2d 627 (2009).
166. 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
167. 210 Ga. App. 482, 436 S.E.2d 669 (1993).
168. 206 Ga. App. 890, 426 S.E.2d 635 (1992).
169. O.C.GA. § 37-3-4 (1995). O.C.G.A. § 37-3-4 provides for immunity of "[ainy
physician, psychologist, peace officer, attorney, or health official, or any hospital official,
agent, or other person employed by a private hospital or at a facility operated by the state,
by a political subdivision of the state, or by a hospital authority" when complying in good
faith with the admission and discharge of patients pursuant to, inter alia, O.C.GA. ff 37-320 (1995) and O.C.G.A. § 37-3-22 (1995). O.C.GA § 37-3-4.
170. Etheridge,210 Ga. App. at 485, 436 S.E.2d at 672; Poss, 206 Ga. App. at 892,426
S.E.2d at 638; see Krachman, 301 Ga. App. at 365 & n.2, 687 S.E.2d at 630 & n.2.
171. 301 Ga. App. at 364-65 & n.2, 687 S.E.2d at 629-30 & n.2.
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L. Discovery and Sanctions
Another extremely important aspect of the court of appeals opinion in
Resource Life v. Buckner 7 1 is the court's holding that the trial court
did not err in entering a discovery sanction that the defendant argued
would cost it an excess of $400 million,'73 which the Authors believe
to be the largest discovery sanction in Georgia history. The trial court's
order specifically noted that it was sanctioning the defendant for two
independent reasons: (1) the defendant's failure to fully comply with a
court order and (2) the defendant's false claim in its discovery responses
that it did not have certain information it was ultimately caught
concealing."7 Recognizing the trial court's broad discretion in controlling discovery and issuing sanctions, the court of appeals held the trial
court acted appropriately in sanctioning the defendant "because of its
patently false discovery responses and its misrepresentations to the trial
court.""' This opinion, read in conjunction with MetropolitanAtlanta
Rapid Tansit Authority v. Doe,"' makes clear that a party falsely
contending it has no responsive evidence to an opposing party's discovery
request subjects itself to the most severe sanctions available to the court,
including dismissal and default judgment. 7 7
M.

Expert Testimony and Affidavit Requirements

1. Scope of Testimony. The supreme court issued an important
opinion regarding the scope of medical expert testimony in medical
malpractice actions in Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group, PC. 78
In Condra the court overruled Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia
Associates, PC.,' holding that evidence of a medical expert's personal
practices "is admissible both as substantive evidence and to impeach the
expert's opinion regarding the applicable standard of care.""s
The plaintiff in Condraalleged that her treating physician inappropriately prescribed the drug Tegretol and failed to conduct blood count
monitoring. The plaintiff also contended that this oversight caused her

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

304 Ga. App. 719, 698 S.E.2d 19 (2010).
Id. at 738-40, 698 S.E.2d at 35-36.
See id. at 734, 698 S.E.2d at 32.
Id. at 734-87, 698 S.E.2d at 32-34.
292 Ga. App. 532, 664 S.E.2d 893 (2008).
See id. at 537, 664 S.E.2d at 898; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(b) (2006).
285 Ga. 667, 681 S.E.2d 152 (2009).
275 Ga. 240, 563 S.E.2d 431 (2002), rev'd, 285 Ga. 667, 681 S.E.2d 152 (2009).
Condra, 285 Ga. at 669, 681 S.E.2d at 154.
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to contract aplastic anemia, a serious bone marrow disease. 8' Before
trial, a medical expert for the defense stated in a deposition that blood
count monitoring during Tegretol therapy was not a "mandatory or
essential" course of action, but the expert also admitted "that it was his
usual practice to conduct blood count monitoring when he prescribed
The defendants moved to prevent the plaintiff from
'Igretol."m8
inquiring about the expert's personal practices at trial, and the trial
court granted the motion." Relying on Johnson, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that such testimony was
irrelevant. 8
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and overruled
Johnson based upon a statute regarding expert testimony in civil
actions, O.C.G.A. § 2 4 -9-6 7 . 1 ,18 that was enacted by the legislature as
part of the Tbrt Reform Act of 2 0 0 5 .'" The statute requires that a
testifying medical expert have "actual professional knowledge and
experience" in the area of his or her testimony, and that any opinions
rendered by the expert must be "the result of having been regularly
engaged in: (A) The active practice of such area of specialty of his or her
Based on the
profession for at least three of the last five years."'
language of the statute, the court held that "there can be no dispute as
to the relevance ... of an expert's personal experience and practice to
the threshold inquiry into the expert's qualifications."'s The court
further recognized that "[tihe relevance and importance of a medical
expert's personal choice of a course of treatment is highly probative of
the credibility of the expert's opinion concerning the standard of
care.""' In response to the defendants' arguments that allowing such
testimony would confuse the jury about the difference between an
expert's personal procedures and the relevant standard of care, the court
held "that such potential for prejudice does not as a general rule
outweigh the usefulness of such information in evaluating an expert's

181.
182.
183.
184.
433).
185.
186.
154.
187.
188.
189.
Survey

Id. at 667-68, 681 S.E.2d at 153.
Id. at 668, 681 S.E.2d at 153.
Id.
Id. at 669, 681 S.E.2d at 154 (citing Johnson, 275 Ga. at 241-42, 563 S.E.2d at
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (2010).
Ga. S. Bill 3 at J 7, 2005 Ga. Laws at 8-10; Condra, 285 Ga. at 669, 681 S.E.2d at
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(cX2XA).
Condra, 285 Ga. at 669-70, 681 S.E.2d at 154.
Id. at 670, 681 S.E.2d at 154; Overby et al., TrialPracticeand Procedure,Annual
of Georgia Law, 51 MERCER L. REV. 487, 501 (1999).
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credibility" and any confusion could be remedied with proper jury
instructions.'"
After issuing its opinion in Condra, the supreme court remanded a
case, Griffin v. Bankston,"e' that involved a similar issue back to the
court of appeals for reconsideration." That case involved a dentist's
failure to prescribe penicillin as a precautionary measure, which
allegedly resulted in the patient contracting a bacterial infection. In
Griffin the oral surgeon who treated the patient during her hospitalization testified that administering penicillin would not have prevented the
bacterial infection, but he did not offer testimony on the standard of care
applicable to the defendant dentist.193 The trial court excluded
testimony from the oral surgeon that his personal practice was to
administer penicillin as a preventative measure, and, in its first review
of the case," the court of appeals affirmed." Upon reconsideration
based on the decision in Condra, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court and held that testimony regarding the treating surgeon's usual
In so holding, the court of appeals first
practice was admissible.1'
noted Condra should be applied retroactively." Next, the court held
that under the logic of Condra, evidence of a medical expert's personal
practices may be admissible even if the expert "did not offer an expert
opinion concerning the standard of care.^"' According to the court, the
evidence is relevant to the expert's qualifications and credibility, and,
therefore, it should be available for the jury to consider.'
Thus, based on the decisions in Condra and Griffin, evidence of a
The
medical expert's personal practices will likely be admissible.2
selecting
when
both
practitioner should be aware of these new decisions
experts and when deposing opposing experts.

2.

Expert Qualifications.

In Craigo v. Azizi, 201 the court of

appeals considered two issues regarding expert qualifications under

190. Condra, 285 Ga. at 672, 681 S.E.2d at 155.
191. 302 Ga. App. 647, 691 S.E.2d 229 (2009).
192. Id. at 647, 691 S.E.2d at 230.
193. Id. at 647-49, 691 S.E.2d at 230-31.
194. Griffin v. Bankston, 295 Ga. App. 387, 671 S.E.2d 873 (2008).
195. Id. at 387, 671 S.E.2d at 874.
196. Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 649-52, 691 S.E.2d at 231-33.
197. Id. at 650, 691 S.E.2d at 232.
198. Id. at 651, 691 S.E.2d at 233.
199. See id.
200. From these two opinions, it is unclear whether the courts would apply the same
admissibility standard to experts outside of the medical malpractice context.
201. 301 Ga. App. 181, 687 S.E.2d 198 (2009).
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O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1. In Craigo the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs
complaint on the grounds that the expert who provided the affidavit
attached to the complainto did not meet either of the two statutory
first, that the expert "[w]as licensed by
qualification requirements:'
an appropriate regulatory agency to practice his or her profession in the
state in which such expert was practicing or teaching in the profession
at such time," and second, that the expert "had actual professional
knowledge and experience in the area of practice or specialty in which
the opinion is to be given.'
As a matter of first impression, the court of appeals preliminarily
reversed the trial court's finding that working as a resident physician,
instead of as an attending physician, does not constitute "active practice"
sufficient to comply with the statute's requirements."
The court of
appeals, nevertheless, affirmed the trial court's dismissal because it
agreed that the medical expert had not satisfied the statute's first
requirement."
Although the expert had a medical license from
Pennsylvania at the time of the negligent act, he was practicing in
Australia at that time.' The court of appeals held that because of the
statute's use of the word "state," a medical expert must practice in the
United States at the time of the negligent act to be qualified as an

202. See O.C.GA. § 9-11-9.1(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (requiring a plaintiff to attach an
affidavit to the complaint that "set[s] forth specifically at least one negligent act or
omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim").
203. 301 Ga. App. at 182, 687 S.E.2d at 199.
204. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(cXl).
205. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(c)2). This prong may be satisfied in one of two ways:
(2) In the case of a medical malpractice action, had actual professional knowledge
and experience in the area of practice or specialty in which the opinion is to be
given as the result of having been regularly engaged in:
(A) The active practice of such area of specialty of his or her profession for at least
three of the last five years, with sufficient frequency to establish an appropriate
level of knowledge, as determined by the judge, in performing the procedure,
diagnosing the condition, or rendering the treatment which is alleged to have been
performed or rendered negligently by the defendant whose conduct is at issue; or
(B) The teaching of his or her profession for at least three of the last five years as
an employed member of the faculty of an educational institution accredited in the
teaching of such profession, with sufficient frequency to establish an appropriate
level of knowledge, as determined by the judge, in teaching others how to perform
the procedure, diagnose the condition, or render the treatment which is alleged to
have been performed or rendered negligently by the defendant whose conduct is
at issue.
Id.
206. Craigo, 301 Ga. App. at 185, 687 S.E.2d at 202.
207. Id. at 186, 687 S.E.2d at 202.
208. Id.
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expert. 209 Therefore, in a professional negligence action, the only
experts who may testify are those who were licensed and practicing in
the United States at the time of the negligent act.
3. Expert Affidavit Requirements. The court of appeals, sitting
en banc, clarified a procedural question concerning the expert affidavit
requirement of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 in professional negligence cases.2 10

In Chandler v. Opensided MRI of Atlanta, LLC, 11 the court held that

a plaintiff who failed to file an affidavit with his original complaint could
voluntarily dismiss and refile the suit (with an affidavit attached)
outside the statute of limitation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61,212 the
renewal statute.2"' In Chandler the defendant failed to file a motion
to dismiss at the same time as its answer to the original complaint. 214
In its answer to the original complaint, the defendant stated, "[A]
defense of failure to file an expert affidavit" and included "a generic
request, in the prayers for relief, that the case be dismissed."215 The
court ruled that these statements were not enough to trigger O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-9.1(f),216 which prevents a plaintiff who fails to file the required
affidavit from dismissing and refiling outside the statute of limitations
under the renewal statute if "the defendant raises the failure to file such
an affidavit by motion to dismiss filed contemporaneously with its initial
The court recognized, based on the "plain
responsive pleading."2
language" of the statute, that an answer saying the complaint should be
dismissed was not equivalent to a motion to dismiss. 218 Because the
statute specifically requires a motion filed at the same time as the initial
answer, the court held that the defendant had waived its ability to
invoke section 9-11-9.1(f).219
The procedural scenario that typically arises in cases like Chandler,
in which the allegations border between simple and professional
negligence, is that a plaintiff, presumably believing his or her case
209. Id. at 186-87, 687 S.E.2d at 203.
210. Chandler v. Opensided MRI of Atlanta, LLC, 299 Ga. App. 145, 682 S.E.2d 165
(2009).
211. 299 Ga. App. 145, 682 S.E.2d 165 (2009).
212. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (2007).
213. See Chandler,299 Ga. App. at 157-58,682 S.E.2d at 176. See generally O.C.G.A
§ 9-2-61(a).
214. Chandler,299 Ga. App. at 148, 682 S.E.2d at 170.
215. Id. at 149, 682 S.E.2d at 170.
216. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(f) (Supp. 2010).
217. Chandler,299 Ga. App. at 147-49,682 S.E.2d at 169-70; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-119.1(f); O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61.
218. Chandler, 299 Ga. App. at 148-49, 682 S.E.2d at 170.
219. See id. at 149-50, 682 8.E.2d at 171.

2010]

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

363

involves simple or ordinary negligence, files a complaint without an
expert affidavit. The defendant then buries in a laundry-list of other
defenses in the answer the allegation that the complaint was invalid and
should be dismissed for failure to include an expert affidavit. The
defendant then waits until the statute of limitations runs to file a
motion to dismiss, which deprives the plaintiff of the right to dismiss
and refile with an affidavit pursuant to the renewal statute. This
decision should end such gamesmanship. Regardless, the case is a
familiar cautionary tale for plaintiffs: when in doubt about whether the
case involves simple or professional negligence, file an expert affidavit
with the original complaint.
N. Vicarious Liability
In Hicks v. Heard,' the supreme court departed from its prior
precedent and held as a matter of law that an "on call" employee
operating a company-owned vehicle was not acting in the scope of her
employment at the time she was involved in an automobile collision.22 1
The majority opinion acknowledged that its holding differed from the
conclusion reached in Allen Kane's Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes,2 the
seminal case setting forth the analytical framework on which Hicks
The opinion in Allen Kane's Major Dodge explained that if
relied.'
an employee operating a company-owned vehicle is "subject to call at any
time," the issue of whether the employee was operating the vehicle in
the scope of his or her employment should survive summary judgment
and go to the jury.'
The majority in Hicks argued that the "on call" statement in Allen
Kane's MajorDodge was merely dicta "that, if followed, would perpetrate
The dissent, authored by Justice Carley and
error in the law."'
joined by Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Benham, countered that
the majority was merely manipulating the analytical framework set
forth in Allen Kane's Major Dodge to reach its desired result.'
Practitioners with similar cases are advised to carefully review both
Hicks and Allen Kane's MajorDodge when marshalling evidence to avoid
summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability.

220. 286 Ga. 864, 692 S.E.2d 360 (2010).
221. Id. at 864, 876, 692 S.E.2d at 360, 368.
222. 243 Ga. 776, 257 S.E.2d 186 (1979).
223. See 286 Ga. at 865, 692 S.E.2d at 362.
224. 243 Ga. App. at 783, 257 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Massey v. Henderson, 138 Ga.
App. 565, 566, 226 8.E.2d 750, 752 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. 286 Ga. at 870-71, 692 S.E.2d at 364.
226. Id. at 876, 692 S.E.2d at 368 (Carley, P.J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The above cases and legislation have most significantly affected trial
practice and procedure in Georgia over the survey period. This Article,
however, is not intended to be exhaustive of all legal developments on
this topic.

